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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In Re:

ROBERT B. HANSEN
No. 15605

Disciplinary Proceeding

BRIEF OF UTAH STATE BAR CCMMISSION

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged in a formal complaint before the
Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar in four counts
with multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar, relating to legal work done by
him as an attorney and counselor of the Utah State Bar.
DISPffiITION OF THE
BCf.l.RD OF CCMMISSIONERS
After a two-day trial, the Hearing Officers entered
findings and decision that Appellant had violated specific
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar relating
to three of the counts; found no violations as to the· fourth;
and recommended to the Board of Commissioners that Appellant
be suspended for one year.

The Board of Commissioners approved

and adopted the findings and recommended to this court that
Appellant be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
THE NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT
The order of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State
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Bar adopting the findings of the Hearing Examiners should be
affirmed and its recommendation that Appellant be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one year should be
adopted.
STATEMENT OF FACT AND ARGUMENT
Three of the counts,

the Dick, Emarine and Lowry matters,

related to activities of Appellant in the private practice of
law.

Much of the alleged misconduct as to these counts pre-

ceded the time when Appellant became Attorney General for the
State of Utah.

The Piepenburg matter related to activity of

Appellant while he was Deputy Attorney General and associated
as counsel for the prosecution in the trial of that case.
charges as to the Dick matter were dismissed.

T~

Nevertheless,

Appellant devotes much space in his brief on it.

We will corrr

only briefly.
Appellant complains that the Commission did not consider
matters in mitigation.

We submit that this is not so.

ing the multiple violations of the Rules,

CoMU

it is apparent the

Commission considered mitigating circumstances in arriving at
recommendation for a one-year suspension.
It is the posit ion of the Bar that the findings are supp:·
by the evidence.

The findings are clear and concise and meet·

allegations of the complaint.

They accurately and fairly refi

the evidence.

It is noted that some of the findings are fav:.:

to Appellant.

Appellant has not demonstrated that the cornmb'

acted arbitrarily or capriciously or that the findings are ii
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POINT I.

THE FINDINGS AND REC~NDATION OF THE BAR
CCMMISSION SHCULD BE ADOPTED UNLESS THE CCURT
IS PERSUADED THAT THE CCMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY,
CAPRICICUSLY, OR BEYOND THE SCOPE OF ITS PCl'1ERS.

This Court has consistently ruled that the findings and
recommendation of the Bar Commission in disciplinary matters
are to be accorded the "presumption of correctness and
propriety."

In re Johnston, 524 P.2d 593, 594 (Ut. 1974).

They should not be overturned unless the Court is persuaded
"that the Commission has acted capriciously, arbitrarily, or
teyond the scope of its powers," Id.; In re

Wad~,

497 P.2d 22

(Ut. 1972), or unless the findings and recommendation are
"plainly in error," In re Badger, 493 P.2d 1273 (Ut. 1972)
modified on reh"

501 P.2d 106 (1952), or "not in accord with

the preponderance of the evidence."

In re Bridwell, 474 P.2d

116 (Ut. 1970).
While it is true, as set forth in Appellant's Brief, that
the three-justice majority in Bridwell, supra, stated that the
recommendation of the Bar Commission is entitled to less weight
on review than the findings, subsequent decisions of this
Court have treated the findings and recommendation with equal
respect.

In re Johnston, supra; In re Badger, supra; See In

re MacFarlane, 350 P.2d 631, 633

(Ut. 1960).

In Badger, the

Court stated:
The Bar commission has recommended that
Mr. Badger's conduct justifies disbarment;
such a recommendation, in the final analysis
constitutes a value judgment, which may be
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accepted, modified, or rejected by this
court.
However, this court has established
a standard that it will sustain the recommendation of the Bar Commission unless it
has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
unreasonably. 493 P.2d at 1275.
The reasons for the respect accorded the findings
and recommendation of the Bar Commission are obvious.

With~

the presumption of correctness and propriety, this Court
would be placed in the position of considering de novo
every disciplinary action brought in the State.
The same rationale applies to the findings of
fact made by the hearing panel of three commissioners.
As hearing officers they are the finders of fact and their
findings are entitled to the same presumption of correctness by the Bar Commission.
In MacFarlane, supra, this Court noted that the
Bar Commission is uniquely qualified to fulfill this role,
stating:

On this problem it is relevant to
observe that the propriety of the questioned conduct must necessarily be directed
to the good conscience and ethical and
moral standards of members of the Bar,
and that the Bar Commissioners as its
elected representatives are peculiarly
suited to be the arbiters of such
standards. They are vitally concerned
with the general conduct of the Bar and
its public relations and are also
seriously concerned with a charge against
a fellow member such as that involved in
the instant proceeding.
350 P.2d at 633.
This Court has also refused to review the mental
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process by which the Bar Commission reached its conclusions.
In re MacFarlane, supra.

Implicit in that holding is

recognition that the hearing officers are uniquely qualified
to decide upon the credibility of witness, the relative
weight to be given competing evidence, and the inferences
to be drawn therefrom.

A mere reading of the "cold"

record could not provide those insights.
For that reason, the only correct and workable
approach is as stated by then Chief Justice Crockett in
dissent in In re Bridwell, supra:
Nevertheless, it is my opinion that
for the same reasons that presumptions
of verity are indulged in favor of those
judgments and orders, some deference should
be indulged to the findings and recommendations of the Bar Disciplinary
Committee and the State Bar Commission;
and that accordingly, we should assume
that they believed those aspects of the
evidence, and the reasonable inferences
to be drawn therefrom, that support
their findings and recommendations; and
that we therefore should survey the
evidence in that light, and sustain their
findings and recommendations unless it
appears that they have acted capriciously,
arbitrarily or unreasonably. 474 P.2d at
117.

Before turning to the separate counts, it should
be noted that Appellant's basic line of attack is to
storm the findings of the commission head-on and attempt
to re-argue the evidence before this Court.

However,

nowhere does Appellant attempt to show that the Bar Commission acted arbitrarily or capriciously.

Beyond that,
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Appellant must show that the findings are plainly in error
or not in accordance with the preponderance of evidence, 1·1he:r.
that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
findings of the Bar Commission.

This Appellant has clearly

failed to do.
POINT II.

COONT FOOR: THE DICK MATTER. THE CQ.1MISSION HAD
AUTHORITY TO "EXONERATE" APPELLANT AND THIS CCURT:
WITHOOT JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE DISMISSAL OF TH:
COONT. THE DISMISSAL SHCULD Nor BE MODIFIED.

Counsel for The Bar Commission are at a loss to understand Appellant's attack on the Commission's decision on
Count Four and its pre-eminent posit ion in Appellant's Brief.
Although Appellant prevailed below, that the Bar Commission
ruled that his conduct did not constitute a violation of

t~

Rules of Professional Conduct, he apparently seeks further
exoneration by attempting to re-argue the entire matter

bef~

this Court.
According to the Revised Rules of Discipline of
the Utah State Bar (1971), the Bar Commission is empowered
to enter an Order dismissing the complaint or to make a
recommendation for discipline to the Supreme court.
III(7).

Rule

Nowhere is the Commission given the power to

"exonerate" a subject attorney.

The finding that the

attorney did not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct and the dismissal of the charge is,

in effect, an

exoneration of the attorney.
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Moreover, a dismissal by the Bar Commission is
conclusive as to all parties.

The Utah State Bar is not

entitled to appeal an adverse ruling by the Commission.
See Rule IV, Revised Rules of Discipline.

Therefore, this

Court does not have jurisdiction to review the Order of
the Commission with respect to Count Four.
But assuming, arquendo, that the Court were to
undertake a review of this count, there has been no showing
of arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the
Commission nor has there been an adequate showing that the
findings go against the preponderance of evidence.

The

decision of the Commission should be upheld and not modified.

The findings accurately reflect the evidence, even

in their so-called "negative" aspects.

Appellant is

entitled only to his finding of no violation and the
dismissal of the particular charge.
POINT III.

COONT THREE. THE PIEPENBURG MATTER. THE EVIDENCE
SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS. EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS
PROPERLY ADMITTED. APPELLANT MAY Nor SHIFT HIS
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO ANorHER.

After hearing extensive evidence with respect to
count Three the commission found that Appellant made
certain statements to a member of the press which a
reasonable person would have expected to be disseminated by
the public media and which related to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the evidence or the merits of the
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case, or which were reasonably likely to interfere with a
free trial.

Appellant attacks those findings and attempts

to re-argue the underlying facts before this Court,
including the credibility of certain witnesses.
As set forth in Point I, above, the findings of
the Commission are entitled to a presumption of correctness and the evidence must be reviewed in the light most
favorable to the Bar, the prevailing party below.

Appellant

may not simply urge his version of the facts upon this Court,
when the Commission has rejected that version, in the absence
of a persuasive showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness
or a disregard of the preponderance of the evidence.
Appellant has failed to make the necessary showing.
There was no dispute in the evidence that Appellant
made the statement, as broadcast, to Mr. Horton, whom
Appellant knew to be a reporter (T.372, 374).

The issue

centered on the circumstances surrounding the interview
and whether Appellant should have reasonably expected
the statement to be broadcast.
The Commission obviously decided to believe the
version of Mr. Horton, an unbiased witness, over that of
Appellant.

The hearing panel was in a singular position

to observe the witnesses and rule on their credibility.
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Nonetheless, Appellant would ask this Court to reject the
testimony of Mr. Horton and devotes pages of his Brief
to an apparent impeachment of the witness' observation or
recollection of the facts.

He chooses to ignore a similar

impeachment concerning his own addition of new testimony at
the hearing.

(T.426, 427).

In any event, the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the Bar, clearly supports the
findings of the Commission.

Mr. Horton interviewed

Appellant at counsel table concerning the jury background
investigation.
notes.

(T.133).

(T.131, 132).

The reporter was taking

As part of the interview Mr. Horton

asked Appellant for his prediction, based on the information
received from the investigation, as to the outcome of the
trial.

(T.133).

Mr. Horton testified that he did not

recall prefacing his question with the words ''incidently"
or "by the way".

(T.133, 149, 150).

The reporter

then prepared a news release containing Appellant's
statement and it was broadcast on the evening news.

(T.134-

136).
The Bar also offered extensive expert testimony
from experienced members of the news media in Salt
Lake City.

(T.90, 162, 183, 201).

These experts established

that the business of the news media is to gather and disseminate information,

(T.102, 205, 211-212); that a public
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official speaks to a reporter at his own peril, absent some
prior agreement that the communication is confidential,
(T.95, 106, 166, 188, 207); and that the only way a public
official can make certain that a statement will not be
disseminated is to not make it.

(T.166, 200, 204).

The

experts further testified in response to a hypothetical
question, based on facts proven by the Bar that the
reporter did not violate a c0nfidence in broadcasting the
statement.

(T.96-102, 167-174, 189-192, 205-208).

Their

opinions did not change when the facts of the hypothetical
were varied by counsel for Appellant.

(T.103-113, 174-182,

193-195, 213-216).
The expert witnesses testified that Mr. Horton
did not violate any confidence or understanding, even if
Appellant used the words "incidently" or "by the way,"
or if the interview took place on the way out of the
building, or if the reporter knew of the judge's concern.
(Id.)

There was testimony that reporters often interview

public officials while in transit.

(T.179).

The Bar submits that the expert testimony
was material to the issue of what a reasonable person
could expect to be disseminated by the media.

A reasonable

expectation is determined by the general practice in the
community and that practice is established by the media.
only way a public official can control dissemination is to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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keep quiet and thereby eliminate the source.
speaks, he is at the mercy of the newsman.

Once he
Of course, the

newsman may agree in advance to keep it "off the record".
If not, however, the statement may be broadcast if it is deemed
newsworthy.

Any expectation to the contrary by Appellant, or

any other person, would be patently unreasonable.
Appellant also relies heavily on the "Statement
of Principles and Guidelines for Reporting",

(Ex. 33),

as establishing a joint responsibility for not disseminating
such a statement.

Appellant was aware of the guideline

contained in paragraph 33 of the Statement of Principles at
the time he was interviewed.
not.

(T.406).

Mr. Horton was

(T.152, 154).
Assuming arquendo, that Mr. Horton was profes-

sionally and ethically bound by the guideline and, assuming
further, that he breached that duty by broadcasting the
statement, Appellant's conduct would still not be excused.
The guidelines purport to impose a dual responsibility upon
the bar and the media.

This responsibility is in addition

to the duties imposed on the bar by DR 7-107(B) (6) and
DR 7-107(D).

Appellant may not justify his breach of those

responsibilities by claiming that he reasonably expected
that the reporter would not violate them as well.

It may

be that they both violated their respective duties, however,
the latter does not abs0lve the former.

The Rules of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

Discipline were meant to be obeyed by the Bar.

We may not

shift our obligation to others.
All of the arguments put forth by Appellant to
show that Mr. Horton should have known not to broadcast
the statement apply with greater force to Appellant's
making the statement in the first place.

If Mr. Horton

should have known of the concerns of the judge and defense
counsel and of the fact that dissemination of such a statement might prejudice the jury, Appellant was in an even
better position to know these things.
that he did know of these concerns.

Appellant testified
(T.429).

Appellant

also knew that the statement should never have been broadcast.

(T.431).

He should have known equally that the

statement should never have been made.
There was no reason for Appellant to have made
the statement in the first place.

He did not know Mr.

Horton nor did he have a special relationship with him.
(T.372).

Mr. Horton had no pressing reason to know Appellan:

prediction of the outcome of the trial.

The Rules of

Discipline and the Ethical Considerations impose a clear
duty on an attorney in these circumstances.
is to remain silent.

That duty

There are ample facts in evidence

to support the Bar Commission's findings and recommendation on this charge and they should be sustained by this
Court.
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POINT IV.

CC:UNT TWO. THE EMARINE MATTER. THE EVIDENCE
SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS. APPELLANT DID Nor
MAINTAIN Ca.!PLETE AND ADEQUATE RECORDS AND
DID Nor MAINTAIN THE FUNDS IN A SEPARATE TRUST
ACCC:UNT. THE MITIGATION CLAIMED BY APPELLANT
WAS GIVEN DUE REGARD.

Appellant undertook to perform legal services for
Winona Emarine in the collection of child support payments
due from her former husband, Berry Belcher.

(T39, 40).

Belcher had checks, generally, in the sum of $65.00 each
(Ex.

30), made payable to Winona Emarine or Winona Tucher

(her former name) and deposited with the Clerk of the Court.
(T40).

Appellant either picked up the checks or had the

Clerk mail them to him.

Pursuant to a power of attorney (T40),

Appellant then indorsed the checks and caused them to be
deposited to his account

(Ex.

30).

For a period of time, Mrs. Emarine received disbursements
from Appellant.

However, from July of 1970 until December of

1974, she heard nothing from him, at which time, the failure
of Appellant to disburse surfaced.
an affidavit (Ex.

Appellant sent Mrs. Emarine

12) based on the records of the Clerk of the

Court which indicated some child support payments had been made
during the years 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972 but not fully disbursed
to her.

She requested an explanation (Ex.

11)

(T41, 42, 43).

Again, by letter dated February 2, 1975, she asked who received
the money because she hadn't (Ex.

13)

(T44) .

She contacted the Appellant personally by phone in the
summer of 1975 and was told he had been too busy to check his
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records

(T46).

After she made several attempts to get the

matter settled and received no cooperation from Appellant,
she hired an attorney to help her (T47, 49).
Her attorney then contacted Appellant and requested
accountings and funds by letters dated August 2, 1975 (Ex.
August 21, 1975 (Ex.

17) and August 27, 1975 (Ex.

1

19).

Appellant did not make an accounting and action was filed
against him in the District Court of the Third Judicial
District in and for Salt Lake county, State of Utah in
October of 1976 (Ex.

27).

In his brief Appellant admits he failed to account.

ll

is noted that it was only just prior to the Bar Commission
hearing that Appellant finally hired his former secretary
and an accountant for the purpose of analyzing his records.
It was apparent that the child support payments made by
Belcher during the years 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972 were
received by Appellant and deposited in his bank accounts.
However, he failed to promptly notify Mrs. Emarine as to
the receipt of these funds

(T41)

It was only after the intervention of counsel that
matter got settled.

th~

other than two small payments (T48),

Appellant refused to pay over sums due until Mrs. Emarine
exhibited to Appellant the original of Belcher's cancelled
child support checks showing that they were indeed made and
were deposited in Appellant's bank accounts and cleared the
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(TSO).

(Mrs. Emarine obtained these checks from Mr.

Belcher and his widow in a piecemeal fashion).

Then and

only then did Appellant disburse.
Even under these circumstances, Appellant, while
paying interest,

insisted on deducting his fee

(TSO, Sl, 409).

Appellant paid $449.28 on September 4, 197S, after
production of some of Belcher's checks.

Appellant deposited

a check for $128S.00 with the Clerk of the Court on September 27,
1976, which was paid on January 10, 1977, after production of
some more of Belcher's checks.

Appellant paid $599.00 by

check (TS6) on February 23, 1977, after the production of
the rest of Belcher's checks

(Ex. 31).

At the hearing, Appellant admitted he failed to maintain
all funds collected in a separate account and commingled the
same with his own funds
brief.

(T416).

This is also admitted in his

Further, Appellant stated that he closed out his trust

account and utilized the trust funds that.were in that account
for his own purposes (T416).
Appellant argues that he is entitled to an unequivocal
finding, that he maintained complete and adequate records.

On the other hand, he could not determine what checks had
cleared the bank, nor could he render an accounting therefrom.
He admitted the weakness in his record keeping system was the
failure to keep a check register (T414).

He stated he was

concerned that the Belcher checks were bouncing.

He admitted
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that any such checks would have been mailed back to him,
but hecnuldn't remember if they were.

His records were

i11adequate to assure prompt and proper disbursement of
clients'

funds.

The evidence supports the findings that:
Appellant undertook to perform legal services for one
Winona Emarine in the collection of child support, and he
collected funds for his client;
Appellant failed to notify his client of the receipt
of the said funds;
Appellant failed to render an appropriate accounting
of funds collected to his client;
Appellant failed to maintain complete and adequate
records of the funds which he collected;
Appellant failed to pay the funds over to his client
promptly as they were received, or when requested to do so
by his client;
That the foregoing conduct constituted violations of
the provisions of Rule IV, Canon 9 DR 9-102

(B)

(1),

(3)

of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar;
That the said acts did constitute a violation of the
provisions of Section 78-51-42, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
As Amended;
That Appellant failed to maintain the funds collected
in a separate trust account and commingled the same with hi'
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own funds;
That said acts violated the provisions of Rule IV,
Canon 9 DR 9-102 (A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
of the Utah State Bar.
It is apparent the Bar Commission took into account
matters of so-called mitigation.

If any of the violations

had been found to be the result of willful and deliberate
misconduct, the Appellant should receive a harsher penalty
and the Commission would have so recommended.
The Commission exercised restraint and gave the
Appellant every benefit of matters in mitigation in recommending a suspension of only one year.
POINT V.

COONT ONE OF
FINDINGS ARE
SUPPORTED BY
BY APPELLANT

THE CCT>l.PIAINT: THE L<l1RY MATTER. THE
ACCURATE, FAIR, AND IN EACH INSTANCE,
THE EVIDENCE. THE MITIGATION CLAIMED
WAS GIVEN DUE REGARD.

The Appellant has raised three "technical defenses" to
Count One.

He claims that no attorney-client relationship

existed betweenh]m and the complaintants.
In 1963, the Appellant initiated legal action against
Allen B. Gardner and Leslie L .. Boothe, naming
Insurance company as the plaintiff (T-269).

Frankli~

Life

The Appellant

thereafter between 1965 and 1970, periodically collected
amounts on the Boothe Suit.

(T-272)

In 1966 he began

remitting the sums collected directly to Mrs. Lowry.

(T-273)

When asked if he didn't know and believe that Mr. Lc:llNry, and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

subsequently his widow, were the real parties in interest
in Lhat suit, he stcited:

"I must have thought thcit, yes."

(T-275)
The Appellant claims a three year statute of limitatior,,
as his second "technical defense".

He alleges that the

last activity on the Lowry matter occurred in 1966.

This io

obviously incorrect since he admits collections in 1970.
(T-275)

The real issue, however, are the allegations contair.,

in the Complaint, to-wit:

his neglect and failure to proper'.

account for the funds collected.

These acts of omission

continued up to and past the filing of the Complaint with
Bar.

t~

The Appellant admits he did not even attempt to make a

final accounting until July of 1976.

(T-281)

Appellant claims as his third "technical defense" that
his acts did not constitute neglect as defined in the
Bar Association informal opinion No. 1273.

Amer~!

The evidence on

this point is overwhelmingly to the contrary, as discussed fo
greater detail hereinafter.
The Findings state that the Appellant failed to
notify his clients of the receipt of funds within a reasonab:
time.

The evidence shows that on at least twelve separate

occasions between O:::tober 30, 1968 and May 14, 1970, he
received payments on the Boothe suit and made no remittance
to anyone until after the Complaint was filed with the Bar
Association in 1976.

(T-276)

It would be bizarre to cl0in'
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this was done within a reasonable time.
The Findings state that the Appellant failed to maintain
complete and adequate records of the funds which he collected.
The evidence supports this finding.

Exhibit 46 is Appellant's

purported accounting of money received on the Boothe suit.
Appellant admits that this was prepared after he met with the
screening committee and at their suggestion,
compiled from his receipt books.

(T-286), and was

At the hearing before the

Commission, it was pointed out to the Appellant that in
September of 1965 he filed a garnishee judgment and execution
on the Boothe suit and obtained $68.11 from First Security
Bank.

{T-284)

He admitted he could find no accounting

to show what happened to those funds.

(T-284)

The Findings state that the Appellant failed to render
an appropriate or sufficient accounting to his clients.

The

evidence shows that after the Complaint was filed, the
Appellant submitted a check to Mrs. Lowry for $162.72 with
nothing more than an allegation that it was the balance due
her of the $449. 08 collected.

{Exhibit 7 and T-283)

This

could not be construed to be an appropriate or sufficient
accounting.
The Findings state that the Appellant failed to promptly
pay said funds to his clients as they were received or when
requested to do so by his clients.

The evidence showing lack

of prompt payment has previously been discussed.

The evidence
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further shows that repeated requests were made by Mrs.

Low~

and others to the Appellant to provide some accounting.
Lowry wrote a letter May 6, 1968,
accounting.

Mrs.

(Exhibit 1), requesting an

No response was ever given.

(T-20)

Another

request was made by registered mail dated March 4, 1971,
(Exhibit 4), with no response.

(T-21)

During this period

o;

time, Mrs. Lowry asked her son Jim to assist her in getting
the matter turned over to another lawyer so the matter could:
given better attention.

(T-21)

Jim Lowry made this request

directly to Mr. Hansen at his office.

(T-35)

response was made on a check stub he sent her,

The Appellant'
(Exhibit 2),

stating he would retain and finish the suit and have a progr2•
report by April 15th.

(T-22)

No report was ever furnished.

A third letter was mailed February 10, 1972, together with

Mrs. Lowry's own records of the checks she had received and
requesting an accounting.

(T-23)

None was gi•,ren.

(T-23)

CT

of these letters was found by the Appellant shortly before hL
hearing, unopened.

(T-278)

Additionally, Mrs. Lawry's son:.I

made many phone requests of Mr. Hansen for an accounting, nor.•
of which were ever honored.

(T - 3 6 and 3 7 )

The Findings state that the Appellant failed to maintai~.
the funds collected in a separate trust account and comming~
the same with his own funds.

The Appellant admits that when

he went to work full-time for the Attorney General he assume:
the money remaining in the trust account was his own and dr•
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the money out and used the same.

(T-~92)

The Canons require

that funds belonging to a client be deposited in a trust
account and left there until all disputes with a client are
resolved.

It is incomprehensible that the Appellant

believed all of those funds remaining in his trust account
were his when he had been receiving repeated requests from the
Lowrys for an accounting and had failed to keep a proper
accounting himself.
The Findings state that the Appellant did not complete
the legal services which he undertook for his clients in a
timely manner, that he neglected the matter, and that he failed
and refused to reasonably or adequately communicate with his
clients or their subsequently engaged counsel.
The lawsuit initiated against Allen Gardner in 1963 was
for the principal sum of $2,919.31.

Allen Gardner and Leslie

Boothe were agents for Franklin Life Insurance Company.
J. E. Lowry was the regional manager,

(T-17)

(T-16), and in that

capacity was responsible for overdraws of his agents.

Both

Gardner and Boothe drew advances against unearned commissions.
Their deficit became the responsibility of Mr, Lowry and for
that reason when sums were collected they were paid to him and
then his widow after his death in 1964.
As Mrs. Lowry received money on the Boothe account, she
would deduct it from the balance due from Gardner.

(T-24)

February of 1976 she believed there was still $1,054.21 due
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In

-22-

her on the Gardner account.

(T-24)

The Appellant admits that after 1964 he received no
money on the Gardner account.

(T-284)

He also admits that

other than some minor things that do not appear in the Court
file,

(Exhibit 8), or by any other documentation, he made

virtually no collection efforts on this account after 1964.
(T-285)

Allen Gardner died in 1975, leaving no apparent est::

and thus totally preventing any further collections for Mrs.
Lowry.

An eleven year old file with no action despite repeat

requests from the Lowrys and subsequently ending by the deat'.
of the defendant must be considered neglect within the defim·
tion of the Canons.
Appellant further argues that since there was an
absence of fraudulent or evil intent, the discipline imposed
should be mitigated.

It is submitted that if fraudulent

or evil intent had been present, the Bar Commission would ha"
been justified in recommending disbarment.

Obviously, by on'.

recommending a one year suspension, the Bar Commission has
considered all of the mitigating circumstances to which the
Appellant claims he is entitled.
POINT VI.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IS Nor IMMUNE FRC11 DISCIPLic~
PROCEEDINGS BY THE UTAH STATE BAR BY VIRTUE OF HIS
OFFICE.

The Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys and
counselors of the Utah State Bar are binding upon all its
members.

See Rule I.

Appe lla;1t cannot insulate himself
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from the application of these rules by being elected to the
Office of Attorney General or by being Attorney General.
Appellant asserts the Commission is without authority
to suspend him since such action would be tantamount
to removing him from office.

The purpose of these proceedings

is not removal from office, but inquiry into fitness to
practice law and determination of whether there should be a
suspension.
Section 19, Article VI of the Utah Constitution provides
for impeachment of state officers for high crimes, misdemeanors
or malfeasance in office.

The conduct complained of in these

proceedings may or may not constitute grounds for impeachment,
however, to remove Appellant by this method would require a
trial before the Senate with proof of commission of high crimes,
misdemeanors or malfeasance in office.
Appellant claims that the Utah Constitution and statutues
presume that the Attorney General shall practice law in his
official capacity.

The Utah Constitution at Section 3 of

Article VII provides:
"No person shall be eligible to the office of •••
Attorney General unless he shall have ••. been
admitted to the practice in the Supreme Court of
the ... State of Utah, nor unless he shall be in
good standing at the bar at the time of his election."
The matter of whether the Attorney General must maintain
his license to practice law in order to retain office is not
the subject matter of this proceeding.

It could be decided in
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another proceeding such as one brought under Rule 65Il(b) (1),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

(quo warranto).

Appellant asserts that performance of statutory duties
requires the handling of conflict of interest matters, and
therefore, the Rules of Conduct do not apply to him.

If,

because of the statutes, there is an exception to the applico·
tion of the rules regarding conflict of interest,

it does nat

logically follow that there is exception as to all the rules.
Appellant argues the Court has no authority to
suspend him, yet seems to concede the power of the Court to
reprimand him.

It would seem that the Court either has the

power to discipline the Appellant or that it does not.

The

middle ground apparently urged by Appellant does not appear
to be logical.
The cases of Simpson v Alabama State Bar 311 So.2d 307
and Watson v Alabama, 311 So.2d 311, cited by Appellant state
the law in Alabama, prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Court in Simpson specifically

stated that "The question of whether or not a district
attorney may be disciplined for violation of this Code of
(P. 310)

Professional Responsibility is not before us."

Only one Utah case could be located which deals direct!,.
the problem.

This is the case of In re Burton, 246 P 188,

which involved a state district court judge.

In the Burton

case, disciplinary proceedings charged the judge with two
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counts of misconduct while he was a judge and two related
to his conduct prior to becoming a judge while he was a
county attorney.

It was argued that because a judge is

forbidden from practicing law and because the state constitution provides for impeachment proceedings for judicial
misconduct, that impeachment is the exclusive remedy, and
the Utah Supreme Court has no power to disbar judges.

The

court noted that:
... there is good authority to sustain the
proposition that, if sufficient cause exists
therefore, an attorney at law may be disciplined
or disbarred and his license to practice law
cancelled and revoked, though he holds or occupies
a judicial or other official position, or is not
for other reasons engaged in the practice, and
though further committed offenses or wrongs.
246 P. at 198-199.
The court went on to adamantly assert its power over all
members of the bar, no matter what their official positions.
It may as well be said that we cannot deal with
an attorney and counselor at law as a member of
the bar of this court, if holding a judicial or
other public or official position, if the wrongs
and conduct committed render him subject to
indictment, or at least until he is convicted, as
to say that we may not deal with him for wrongs
and conduct rendering him subject to impeachment,
or at least not until he is removed. from office.
It is generally held that misconduct from an
attorney, even outside of his professional
dealings as such, may be sufficient to justify his
discipline or disbarment ... and this court is
committed to the doctrine that an attorney, as
a member of this court, may be disciplined and
disbarred though the acts and conduct are not directly connected with his practice, if they show
such a lack of honesty, integrity, and fidelity
as to indicate that he is an unfit and improper
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person to be entrusted with the powers and clutie:c
of an attorney ... This court is further commited to the doctrine that its power to deal with
its own officers, including attorneys, is inherent
continui.ng, and plenary, and exists independ<"ntl~··
of statute and ought to be assumed and exercised
as the exigencies and necessities of the case
require ... and that courts having power to admit
attorneys to the bar, also possess, as a
necessary and inherent incident of such power the
right to disbar them for unworthy behavior, unprofessional conduct, or moral turpitude, or moral
unfitness independently of authority given by
statute.
246 P. at 199-200.
The court did acknowledge that their power in such instances
went only to the status as attorney, and had no direct

ef~~

on the official position of the accused attorney, judicial
or otherwise.
The position taken by the Utah Supreme Court in
the Burton case is identical to that taken by most other
state supreme courts.

The Kansas Supreme court disagreed

with the position that an accused attorney who is also a
judge can be subject to disbarment as an attorney only after
forfeiture of that office. " •. it is the law of the land
established by the great weight of authority, than an
attorney possessing a license to practice law and holding a
judicial position, such as is now occupied by the accused,
is subject to disbarment in the proceedings of the characte!
here involved."
29, 32 (1959).

In re Stice, 184 Kansas 589, 339 P.2d.
The court went on to cite supportive cases

from the states of Ohio, Nebraska, Arizona, Connecticut,
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Illinois, New Hampshire,
~isconsin,

and Colorado.

Ohio, South Dakota, Washington,
See also,

In re Watson, 286

P.2d 254 (Nevada, 1966), and State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar
Association v. James, 463 P.2d 972

(Oklahoma, 1969).

It appears to be obvious that the Rules of Professional
Conduct of the Utah State Bar as approved by the Supreme
Court are intended to apply to an attorney who occupies
the office of attorney general as well as to all other
members of the Bar.

This is

notwithstanding the fact

that Utah has impeachment and removal procedures prescribed
by the constitution and by statute.
CONCLUSION
As to the Emarine and Lowry matters, Appellant does not
seem to object to the findings that there was a failure of
notification of the receipt of funds, failure to render an
appropriate accounting and failure to pay the funds over.
It is also noted Appellant admits there was a failure to
maintain all funds collected in a separate trust account.
Appellant argues that the Bar should have found that he maintained complete and adequate records.

However, if this were

the case, he would have been able to render an accounting
when requested.

Whatever records he did maintain were

insufficient for this purpose.
Appellant argues that he is entitled to a finding that he
cl

id not comm:i ng le funds .

The evidence is contrary.

Furthermore,
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Appellant admitted he closed out his trust account at a
~hen

tim~

clients funds had not been disbursed.
Appellant complains that the findings should contain

mitigating circumstances.

Yet matters in mitigation were

obviously considered by the Commission.

If these acts of

misconduct of Appellant were found to have been committed
wilfully and deliberately, a harsher penalty, perhaps disbarment, would have been recommended.
In the Dick matter, Appellant is entitled to no more
than an Order dismissing that Complaint.

See Rule III of

the Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar.
In the Piepenburg matter, the evidence was sufficient t: ·
support the findings.
The findings of the Bar should be affirmed and the
recommendation that Appellant be suspended from the practice
of law for one year should be adopted.
DATED this 31st day of May, 1978.
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